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The Mechanisms of the Optional Protocol to the Genocide
Convention and its links to R2P

JEAN-FRANÇOIS BUSSIÈRE-WALLOT1

The Optional Protocol to the Genocide Convention was drafted taking into account
the UN Charter and practice to fit neatly into the UN and regional system. This is
done by respecting the various roles and powers assigned to the General Assembly,
the Security Council and the Regional Organizations under the UN Charter. The
specific roles of each under the Protocol will be discussed, as well as the specific
mechanisms for Regional Organizations under Article 5. The decision-making on
genocide and its preparatory steps under Article 3, working in conjunction with
Article 4, creates an obligation to act on normally non-binding recommendations by
the UN General Assembly or by a relevant Regional Organization, assuming the
Security Council fails to act. The Protocol also addresses potential peacekeeping
issues in emergency genocide prevention or suppression to ensure the effective
protection of civilians and the funding of such missions. This presentation also
discussed the links between the Optional Protocol and the Responsibility to Protect.

Greg Stanton has already explained to great length why we feel this proposal is
necessary2. What I want to do is explain the scope of the protocol, its mechanisms and its
relationship with the UN Charter as well as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Wherever
possible, I’ll link my explanation of the Protocol and its mechanisms to examples of how
1
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that could work. Please keep in mind that a lot of its provisions are meant to be flexible
and adaptable. The Protocol intentionally leaves a lot of room for policy decisions so that
it can remain pertinent as the field of genocide prevention evolves, but also as the world
and international law evolve. It is similar in that respect to the Responsibility to Protect,
largely because it is inspired by it, and rather than focusing on a specific solution, seeks
to provide tools to alleviate risks of genocide while also integrating the norm of R2P
within the folds of international law. R2P is already much linked with international law
currently, because it is a norm which is inspired from the legal obligations States and
other international actors have to respect the Conventions and covenants they have
signed, such as the Geneva and Genocide Conventions, and because it draws on the legal
vocabulary of state responsibility. In practice however, R2P is much more of a political
commitment not to tolerate violations of the most important norms of international law
protecting human rights, and in particular, the right to life3.

The Scope of the Protocol
Let’s start with mentioning briefly the scope of the Protocol. It has three principal
mechanisms that deal with preventing or halting genocide. The three principal
mechanisms involve cooperation in the prevention of genocide through information
sharing and leadership training4, establishing institutions to rapidly recognize situations
that may lead to genocide5 and strengthening both the regional mechanisms for
intervention in the event of genocide, and the cooperation between the UN and regional
organizations6. I will discuss each of the mechanisms in turn while linking them to the
appropriate decision-making bodies and illustrating how that might work out. Because
the Genocide Convention, through measures like criminalizing incitement7, addresses the
first pillar of R2P which is the question of state responsibility to protect its population
from genocide, the Protocol focusses more on the two other pillars of R2P, namely the
responsibility of the international community to assist the state in fulfilling its protection
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obligations and if necessary, to take collective action8.

The Preventive Aspect
The main disposition for early prevention is found in Article 2 which aims to create an
international network in genocide prevention. According to Article 2 (a), states would
have to monitor and document genocide and early warning signs of genocide… wherever
they may occur. This would include information regarding the other crimes that are war
crimes and crimes against humanity, if only for the reason that some of those crimes may
overlap with genocide acts if the intent is there. This information would then be freely
shared with Regional Organizations and Multilateral Organizations of which the
signatory states are members if those organizations conduct genocide prevention9. These
organizations could be traditional regional ones like the European Union or the African
Union, they could be sub-regional organizations and they could be non-regional as well,
provided they are involved in genocide prevention in one form or another.
Cooperation would also be done between the national level and the UN, between the
regional or multilateral organizations and the UN, as well as between regional
organizations10. From a legal point of view, binding an international organization through
a treaty is tricky, since non-state international actors like the UN and regional
organizations are not always explicitly allowed to join a treaty, and therefore are hard to
bind by treaties they haven’t signed. For an example of this, let me just point you out to
the decades-long debate over whether, or how much, the UN is or is not bound by the two
human rights covenants it helped to negotiate or whether its peacekeepers need to respect
international humanitarian law.
The approach I took was a very practical one: make it an explicit state responsibility to
get the various organizations, whether regional or multilateral, that are involved with
genocide prevention, to talk to one another and likewise share information11. In some
8
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cases it may require getting enough states in an organization on board with the protocol
for the cooperation to be mandated by the treaty, if only because those organizations need
to follow their own rules; in practice, I don’t expect it to be a major issue. The European
Union and the African Union talk to one another, the U.S. Department of State at times
works with sub-regional African organizations and the Latin American Network for
Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention is in contact with the UN, for example.
Likewise, the individual state actors would have to collaborate among each other12. One
particular issue I singled out for cooperation between state parties is the criminal
activities of militias and organizations operating across their national boundaries13, since
those can often be involved in attacks on civilians, or are génocidaires themselves. As an
example of this, let me just point to the militias in East Congo, some of whom were
active in the Rwandan genocide14.
The Office of the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide would serve as the
center of contact at the UN, for obvious reasons. It would coordinate UN prevention and
suppression of genocide, dispatch the information to the appropriate UN agencies, as well
as offer leadership training on risk assessment and genocide prevention to those states
and organizations which need it15. He would also ensure that urgent information reaches
the media and the public, he would also make it available to NGO’s involved in human
rights, humanitarian activities, or which have otherwise declared themselves interested by
that information. Those organizations would be taken straight from the list of those in
consultative status with ECOSOC or associated with the UN Department of Public
Information, since there’s no need to create an extra structure when one is already in
place.
One word about the graphic: it may look hierarchical, but that’s mostly due to my modest
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illustration skills16. What you need to envision is a global network, a web, of national,
regional and multilateral actors coming together for the purpose of early warning and
genocide prevention, with civil society acting as a check and watchdog for inaction. The
goal is to ensure that the efforts which are being deployed in some regions become
global, but also that they are sustained through time. This section gives legal weight to
pillar 2 of the R2P by bringing the international community to help national actors with
early warning, and also implements effectively paragraph 138 of the 2005 World Summit
Outcome, in which the larger international community committed not just to pillar 2, but
also to help the United Nations establish an early warning capability17. It also addresses
two challenges which are recurrent in implementing R2P, namely insufficient
international, regional and local capacity to prevent atrocities as well as the systematic
gaps in communication and cooperation among actors involved in prevention and early
warning.

Quick Recognition of Genocide
The second mechanism aims at establishing institutions to rapidly recognize situations
that may lead to genocide. Under the Genocide Convention’s Article VIII, the states
which are party to the Convention “may call on the competent organs of the UN to take
such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the
prevention and suppression of acts of genocide”. The key word here is may, in other
words at the present, they may as well do nothing, or at least nothing that has to do with
the larger international community. We believe this vision is outdated, especially since
the development and adoption of the Responsibility to Protect, and Article 3(c) of the
Protocol spells out a clear duty for the States to bring acts of genocide, including
preparatory steps towards the accomplishment of such acts, to the attention of the proper
forum. Those forums are the UN General Assembly, the UN Security Council and
relevant Regional Organizations. Those regional organizations which are considered
relevant for the purpose of the Protocol are those which have been empowered by their
16
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members to intervene to prevent or stop genocide in their region 18. This is currently the
case of the African Union19, notably, but it could involve other such organizations in the
future, as decided by those organizations and their members.
So what happens when the attention is brought at the UN or in a regional organization?
Essentially, the members of that organization or organ deliberate according to their
internal rules over whether the acts or preparatory steps could lead to genocide or
constitute genocide20. My colleague may have made that point already, but the point is to
lower the burden of proof so that it doesn’t act like a trial, but rather, the decision should
be a collective acknowledgment of the duty to prevent genocide before it occurs, or if that
failed, then to suppress it. This can be seen as an implementation of the responsibility to
protect civilians from genocidal violence, essentially. Here, the obligation for states is to
take a collective decision by assessing the acts and the risks.
After they take the decision, if they acknowledge the risk or the nature of the act, then
they have to take further steps, but the content of the steps will remain in the policy
arena21. Keep in mind that the decision will be made in both organs of the UN, and
possibly in one or more regional organization at the same time. This can serve in part as a
check against the political paralysis that the UN Security Council can be prone to,
perhaps even an incentive for it to act effectively or to avoid vetoing such questions –
something which a growing number of States have called on the permanent members to
do - but I would argue it’s also a way to involve the regions even more since they have
the potential to be the most effective actors in genocide prevention within their region.
The decision-making process, along with the requirements on national actors I will
discuss shortly, would also mainstream mass atrocity prevention goals within the work of
national, regional and international actors, thus strengthening R2P.

Taking action
18
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Once a decision is made, states have to take a certain number of internal steps, including
conducting a review of their armed forces, police and equipment that could be made
available to a UN mission or to a regional intervention to ensure the effective protection
of civilians22. The Protocol doesn’t mandate committing resources, but at the very least
it’s liable to make states more proactive and hopefully speed up the long delays that can
come before a peacekeeping mission is deployed, since states would have to be aware of
their ability to commit personnel and equipment rapidly, possibly before the decision to
deploy is made – if the early warning system works properly rather than wait for a late
intervention when slaughter has started. They also have the obligation not to exclude the
use of force to protect civilians in any mission in which they participate 23. Most
importantly, they are the wheels which move the other organs into actions.
All decisions are obviously made according to the rules of the appropriate UN or regional
organ. At the Security Council level, a decision is made by 9 out of 15 members, with the
risk of vetoes. The Security Council already has all the tools it needs to take effective
action, and under the Protocol retains its primacy in matters of international peace and
security24. In other words, if the Security Council is doing its job, its decisions will be
applied as they should be. One specific step it should take it to pre-authorize relevant
Regional Organizations to intervene within their region following a decision recognizing
a risk of genocide25.
Assuming the Security Council fails to effective action, the General Assembly and
relevant Regional Organizations have the power to make their recommendations binding
on the States signatory to the Protocol according to article 4. At this time, the General
Assembly has the competence to make recommendations on matters of international
peace and security following the mechanisms of emergency sessions implemented
following the Uniting for Peace resolution26. Such questions are decided by two-thirds
22
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majority, however, like all General Assembly recommendations, are nonbinding27. In
regional organizations, they would be decided according to the mechanisms the members
of the organization have implemented.
By signing the Protocol, states would recognize those recommendations are binding,
whether they come from the General Assembly or a Regional Organization, and carry the
same weight as obligations stemming from the Charter28. In other words, they would
prevail over obligations derived from treaties not linked to the Charter, allowing for
effective smart sanctions regimes, for example. This is possible precisely because
genocide prevention is compatible with the Purposes and Principles of the UN Charter
and also because the Protocol is specifically attributing a competence to an existing organ
of the United Nations that falls under its general broad mandate29.
A specific measure that the General Assembly would have to take would be to finance
regional interventions, when intervention is deemed necessary to prevent or halt
genocide30. One recurring issue with peacekeeping is finding the funding for it. The idea
here is not to solve all peacekeeping issue – that is not within the scope of the Protocol –
but rather to make sure uncertain funding doesn’t become an obstacle when an
emergency intervention is deemed necessary to prevent genocide. This would go a long
way towards insuring that regional organizations that might be struggling with funding
will not bear all the weight that is shifted to them from the larger international
community.
Speaking of peacekeeping, one disposition of the Protocol is that State Parties must
collectively review the equipment, number and mandate of peacekeeping forces in a State
or region where a risk of genocide is recognized, as well as the possibility of deployment,

of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
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and make recommendations if appropriate31. The Protocol doesn’t specify in which forum
this would be done, and indeed this could be done in any of the three forums we’ve
discussed, depending on who deployed the force in the first place, and also keeping in
mind the idea of the complementarity of the organs.

31
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